Most countries have regulations on insider trading. There are heated debates in academic research on the pros and cons of these regulations. The proponents of the regulations focus on the fairness because insiders typically possess superior information about the value of their own companies and they may trade the securities of their own companies at the expense of other investors. Leaving insider trading unregulated will deter stock market investments by the public and hurt the stock market liquidity. The opponents of the regulations argue that insiders bring information to the market and make asset prices more efficient, that insider profits can be viewed as one form of executive compensation, that heavy regulations may destroy the incentives of entrepreneurs and managers to create value for public investors, and that the enforcement of insider trading regulations is difficult and ineffective anyway. While there is no consensus reached, perhaps only a few extremists would argue that insider trading should be left completely unregulated. Given that most countries do have regulations on insider trading, how effective these regulations are, how insiders actually trade legally under the regulations, and the implications for the outside investors in their trading are the focuses of recent empirical studies on insider trading.
In this paper we examine the effectiveness of the insider trading regulations in China.
Insider trading regulations in China are special in many aspects and the research on the effectiveness of these regulations can provide insights for other markets in understanding why certain regulations do not achieve their intended goals and how regulations can be made better to strike a balance between market efficiency and fairness.
China resumed its stock market about twenty years ago as part of its economic reform from a centrally planned economy. The stock market in China is unique in the sense that most listed companies are former state-owned enterprises. For a long time, the majority of the shares have been owned by governments at various levels. These shares were initially deemed non-tradable until the so-called split-share reform in 2005 in which the restriction on tradability was removed and the shares became tradable after a lockup period. The fast expansion of the stock market in recent years also generated vast amounts of restricted stocks held by the insiders which were unlocked over time. At the end of the first quarter in 2008, the market value of the unlocked stocks was 1.42 trillion RMB, almost 20% of the total value of the stock market. In fear of the impact on the market by sales of these unlocked stocks, the security authority issued a Guideline in April 2008 which required that sales of unlocked stocks exceeding a certain amount be conducted in the block trading system in which only institutions and wealthy individuals can trade.
We address the following questions. Is the 2008 regulation, i.e., the Guideline, effective in preventing stock prices from declining due to insider sales and protecting small, outside Our results indicate that the 2008 regulation is not effective. The average cumulative abnormal returns associated with all insider sales of the unlocked stocks in the postGuideline period are negative, declining by -5% over 100 trading days, no better than in the pre-Guideline period. In particular, the average cumulative abnormal returns associated with insider block sales declined more than 8% over 100 trading days. The losses were permanent. The cumulative abnormal returns tend to be more negative if the insider sale size relative to the total number of outstanding shares is greater and the time between unlock date and the sale date is shorter. For insider block trades, the cumulative abnormal returns in the retail market are more negative if the discount in the insider block trade relative to the retail market is greater. Our interpretation of the result is the following. The Guideline created an equilibrium which separates insiders who sell their shares for diversification purposes from those who sell shares for informed trading. In the former cases, insiders choose to sell in retail markets in smaller amounts over longer periods while in the latter cases insiders choose to sell through the block trading system in larger amounts at discounts immediately before bad news leaks to the market. The market (including the counterparties of the insiders in the block trading system) correctly infers this and reacts to the sales through the block trading system more negatively. The reason the Guideline fails to stabilize stock prices and protect small investors is that the regulatory authorities did not fully understand the consequence of such a separating equilibrium and designed corresponding regulations that prevent the counterparties (i.e., the buyers) in the block trading system from reselling the shares in the retail market.
Based on the special ownership structure of China's listed companies, in which the parent companies and other affiliated companies hold the majority of shares and control the listed companies, this paper investigates the sales of unlocked shares by various types of insiders. Further analyses reveal that it is the sales by the affiliated companies, rather than individual insiders, that are responsible for the negative cumulative abnormal returns. The sales of the affiliated companies are informative in the sense that they predict lower future company earnings.
The findings in this paper contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of insider trading regulation and corporate governance. Because of the unique features in China, which are not considered in most studies of insider trading regulation, the findings offer valuable insights on how regulations can be designed better to achieve their goals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a brief review of the relevant literature. Section 2 provides the institutional background of China's stock market with a special emphasis on the unlocked restricted stocks, the corporate structure, insider trading regulations, and the block trading system. Section 3 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics on the variables to be used in later sections. Section 4 presents the basic results on the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the sales of unlocked stocks and their determinants. Section 5 further analyzes the cumulative abnormal returns according to the types of insiders and the predictive power of the insider sales for future company earnings. Section 6 discusses the implications of the findings and concludes the paper.
The Related Literature
The literature on insider trading is voluminous. The following is a brief account of a number of studies that are the most relevant to our work in this paper. These studies focus on the pros and cons of insider trading regulation, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the regulation, insiders' behavior under regulation, and the impact of unlocked insider shares.
Pros and Cons of Insider Trading Regulation
The debate on insider trading regulations centers on the stock price efficiency versus the fairness to the outsider investors. The advocates argue that insider trading, if allowed, will create perverse incentives for insiders to profit on bad news as well as good news, to invest in risky projects, and to delay information disclosure. The opponents disagree. Manne (1966) argues against regulation of insider trading on the basis of efficiency gained from insider trading, which allows security prices to better reflect information and financial investments to better allocat resources. He also argues that the insider trading profits can be viewed as one type of executive compensation for entrepreneurial services. Carlton and Fischel (1983) argue that insider trading can be beneficial if the property right in information is more valuable to the firm's managers. Allowing insider trading can be a value-maximizing arrangement between insiders and outside investors. Dye (1984) shows in a principal-agent model that if managers are initially compensated with earningscontingent contracts, then the welfare of the managers and all of the firm's shareholders can be improved by allowing the managers to trade on their private information. To counter such arguments, Ausubel (1990) presents a model in which investors anticipate that insiders may take advantage of them and refrain from investing in the firm in the first place, resulting in efficiency losses. Insiders can be made better off if they can pre-commit not to trade on their private information. Manove (1989) makes similar arguments. In a rational expectations model, Leland (1992) shows that allowing insider trading makes stock prices higher on average and more accurate in reflecting information; it also makes expected investments higher, markets less liquid, insiders better off, and outsiders and liquidity traders worse off. In this more balanced setting, the effect on overall social welfare is difficult to determine. DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty (1998) discuss the optimal enforcement policy of insider trading regulation, which balances the benefit and cost of the enforcement, in terms of when to enforce, how large the penalty should be, and how much tax should be imposed to finance the enforcement.
The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Regulation
The empirical work on insider trading regulation takes the regulations as given and studies their effects. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document that, out of 103 countries that have stock markets, 87 of them have insider trading laws, but only 38 enforce them.
The cost of equity does not reduce when the law is passed, but it does after the first prosecution. Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Jorgenson (2000) study the case of Mexico in which insider trading laws are not enforced. They document that there are no gains associated with corporate events and interpreted it as evidence that all the gains are reaped by insiders. Banerjee and Eckard (2001) examine the sample period 1897-1903, during which the first wave of mergers in the US took place and insider trading was not restricted. They conclude that insider profit patterns are similar to those in modern times with regulations. Bris (2005) study the insider trading profits associated 4541 acquisitions in 52 countries and find that, on average, the profits are actually bigger after regulations are passed. However, in countries like the US with severe penalties, insider trading profits are lower. Durnev and Nain (2007) use a sample of 2189 firms from 21 countries and find that, on average, stricter insider trading regulations reduce private information trading.
However, for firms with high agency costs, insider trading restrictions are less effective in deterring private information trading.
One of the arguments against insider trading regulations is that regulations merely shift the distribution of profits from insiders to a handful of outsiders, consisting of arbitrageurs and stock analysts, known as information specialists, but benefit public investors very little. In their analyses of news reports preceding takeover bids, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) , Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) , and Meulbroek (1992) attribute significant portions of preannouncement price run-up to these information specialists, rather than (illegal) insider trading.
Insider trading regulation may have impacts on executive compensation. Roulstone (2003) examines the relationship at the firm level in the US. Denis and Xu (2011) examine the relationship in a sample in 2006 consisting of 1,852 US firms and 468 non-US firms with American Depository Receipts (ADRs) from 40 different countries. Unrestricted insider trading is found to be a substitute for executive compensation. Both studies find that firms with stricter insider trading restrictions tend to award higher total compensation and higher equity-based incentive pay to the managers. Another line of studies examine the relationship between insider trading restrictions and market liquidity. Bettis, Coles and Lemmon (2000) use survey questionnaires to examine policies and procedures used by companies. They find that blackout periods imposed by companies successfully suppress insider trading, both purchases and sales, and that the blackout period is associated with a narrower bid-ask spread by about two basis points. Frijns, Gilbert, and Tourani-Rad (2008) find that, after a stricter insider trading rule is enacted in New Zealand, the bid-ask spread is reduced.
Strategic Behavior of Insiders under the Regulations
Regulations may change insiders' trading behavior. Hillier and Marshall (2002) examine the UK evidence on how effective the trading ban before earnings announcement is and conclude that the ban is ineffective. Insiders can easily bypass the ban and time their trading. Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) provide evidence that insiders trade upon the knowledge of specific and economically significant forthcoming accounting disclosures.
However, in order to avoid potential legal action against them, they tend to trade well ahead of future disclosures. Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer (2010) find similar results for the UK firms.
Most broad definitions of insiders include large shareholders, especially controling shareholders. Whether insider trading is regulated also effects the behavior of the large shareholders in monitoring company managers. Maug (2003) argues that, without insider trading regulation, managers may "bribe" large shareholders by passing to them non-public information. The large shareholders then profit by trading on the information and, in return, reduce their monitoring of managers. The context of Maug's analysis is especially relevant to the study in this paper, as China's corporate structure is featured by the dominance of the large shareholders. In their study of UK firms, Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog (2006) also touch on the relationship between insider trading and corporate governance.
Stock Market Behavior at Lockup Expiration
There is one strand of research on the effect of lockup expiration. Lockup here refers to the restriction on insiders from selling their own stocks for a certain period. In the US, these restrictions are imposed by the underwriters during IPOs and SEOs. The lockup period varies across stocks and types of events, but typically lasts between six months to three years. Field and Hanka (2001) One of the unique phenomena in China's stock market is its huge amount of restricted (or nontradable) shares, both in the absolute term and in proportion. The restricted shares are of two types. The first type is generated at initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). At IPOs, the shares held by the original owners become restricted for certain lock-up periods. Some institutional investors who obtained IPO allocation ahead of public share distribution are barred from selling the stock for a period. Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) or rights offerings also generate restricted stocks, which are sold to existing or new institutional investors and are restricted from being sold for a lockup period. Unlike the case in, say, the US, where the lockups are required by the underwriters for easier marketing of IPO shares, the lockups in China's stock market are enforced by regulatory authorities. For controlling shareholders, the lockup period is three years, while for other insiders, the lockup period is one year. There are also some small institutional investors at IPOs who are not listed in the prospectus.
The lockup period for these investors can be as short as three months.
The second type of restricted shares, which is unique to China, is the shares resulted from China's massive privatization scheme. As part of its economic reform, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were privatized through listing on the stock exchanges. In the early years, almost all of the listed companies were created from SOEs. To maintain control, however, the governments at various levels retained most shares, so the listed companies were majority-owned by governments and by some affiliated companies and other insti- 1 The term nontradable means that the stocks cannot be traded on the exchanges, but some stocks, known as legal person shares, owned by companies and institutions can be traded off-exchange. Trading off-exchange entails a huge discount, averaging near 80%, off the exchange-traded prices, as documented by Chen and Xiong (2001) .
2 See Sun and Tong (2003) , Deng, Gan and He (2008) , and Li, Wang, Cheung and Jiang (2011) for descriptions of the privatization process in China and the split-share reform. 
Corporate Structure
When China re-established its stock exchanges in 1991, almost all companies at the time were owned by governments at various levels in the centrally planned economy. The profitability of most companies was poor. Re-establishing the stock market was part of the privatization plan to revitalize the economy. Partially for maintaining the control and partially for keeping an orderly stock market, the governments initially set a tight quota scheme which allowed only a limited number of companies to be listed on the exchanges.
The quotas were then rationed to various provinces and ministries. To meet the listing criteria, the governments encouraged state-owned enterprises to carve out their best assets and to list them as separate companies, majority-owned by the parent companies. Some parent companies owned several listed companies. Over time, as the stock market developed, the quota system was replaced by more standard criteria. However, the corporate structure remained more or less the same as before. In 2006, the beginning of the sample period, most listed companies were still majority-owned by their parent companies and by other affiliated, listed or non-listed, companies. Some of these affiliated companies were fully or partially owned by the same parent companies. The ownership structure determines the governance structure. Panel C of Figure   2 shows the simple average proportion of board directors who represent legal persons (consisting of the parent company, other affiliated companies, and strategic investors) in all directors. The majority is from the parent company and other affiliated companies.
The figure shows that, although the proportion of directors representing legal persons had been declining, it remained above 35% throughout the sample period. Therefore, the parent companies and other affiliated companies can exert large influence on the listed companies and can obtain valuable insider information about the listed companies' performance through board meetings.
The ownership structure also affects the management of the listed companies directly.
As many listed companies were carved out from their parent companies, the top managers of the listed companies were typically subordinates of those in the parent companies.
Panel D of Figure 2 shows the proportion of listed companies that have at least one top officer (defined as CEO, CFO or COO) who used to work for the parent company. A more relevant statistic should include those who used to work for the other affiliated companies.
The data, however, are difficult to come by. Shares of Listed Companies (hereafter, the Guideline), which requires insiders, who anticipate selling stocks within a month with cumulative shares exceeding 1% of total company shares, to sell the shares through the block trading system, instead of the usual retail market. The two exchanges quickly adopted the Guideline as an official rule. In addition, the exchanges suggest that, if a sale amounts to 1.5 million shares or more, it should be conducted through the block trading system even if the sale is less than 1% of total company shares. The effect of the Guideline is a focus of this paper.
Insider Trading Regulations
In September 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange proposed certain rules aimed at curbing insider trading by controlling shareholders. For unknown reasons, however, the CSRC did not act on it and the proposal died unborn.
While the laws and regulations exist, enforcement has been very weak. 
Block Trading System
Block trading in the two exchanges was contemplated in 2001 and implemented in 2002-2003 . After a brief trial period, the rules specified that transactions exceeding half a million shares or 3 million Yuan can be traded through the block trading system. The transactions were conducted after the regular retail markets close. Initially, the transaction price was restricted to lie between the daily low and daily high. After May 15, 2006, the transaction price was no longer restricted that way, but was still subject to the price limit.
4 A block trade had to be entered into the trading system from one broker account through its seat at one of the exchanges. A block trade conducted in an exchange is revealed by the exchange immediately with the identity of the broker account, but not with the identity of the actual traders.
There are allegedly three reasons as to why the Guideline of CSRC requires that large sales of unlocked shares be traded through the block trading system. The first is that block trades occur on a different platform between two parties and do not interfere with the normal trading in the retail market. Therefore, hopefully, the trades would not affect the stock prices in the retail market. Second, since the traders in the block trading system tend to be institutions and experienced wealthy individuals, the counterparties of the insider sales are more knowledgeable about the trades and can better protect themselves by negotiating the prices. Third, since the trades are disclosed shortly afterward to the public, the information contained in these block trades can be quickly conveyed to the market. This can reduce the unfairness caused by asymmetric information between insiders and average investors. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the Guideline is effective in achieving the goal of stabilizing the price and protecting average investors.
Data and Preliminary Analysis
The data we use in this paper are from Wind Data Inc. Besides the usual stock market prices and company accounting variables, the dataset contains all the information about insiders' filing of their transactions and all the block trading transactions. By matching the two sets of transactions, it is easy to identify insider block trades. The sample period is 2006-2010. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all the insider trades, block trades, their intersection, and their complements, before and after the Guideline. The first three columns are the total value in billion Yuan, the number of firms involved, and the number of transactions involved. The remaining seven columns are the descriptive statistics of individual transaction values in million Yuan. Table 1 here Before the Guideline, there were a total of 2453 cases of insider trading involving 470 listed companies. Most of the insider trading cases were conducted through the regular retail markets. Only ten insider trading transactions were recorded in the block trading system. The transaction size of block trades tends to be much greater than that of a retail trade, however. The distribution of the value is extremely right skewed, caused by the trades of some very large companies. The mean is greater than even the 75th percentile.
There are a total of 401 block trades involving 134 companies. The distribution of block trade value is also right skewed, but less so than that of insider trading.
After the Guideline, the number of cases of insider trading more than quadrupled, reaching 10267, while the number of companies involved doubled to 783. Only slightly above a quarter of them were conducted in the block trading system. The transaction size of insider trading after the Guideline was much smaller than before. One may be tempted to attribute this to the market value levels before and after the Guideline, recalling that the stock market had a bull run during 2007, before the Guideline. The transaction size of block trades, however, actually increased after the Guideline. The number of block trade transactions also increased dramatically to 6609. Table 2 reports the total value, the number of transactions, and the descriptive statistics of insider trade value, before and after the Guideline, by insider type. We classify all the insiders considered in this paper into four categories: affiliated companies (consisting of parent companies and other affiliated companies), (institutional) strategic investors, managers (consisting of chairmen, top managers, other directors and other managers), and other individuals who own more than 5% of the total company shares, but are not company employees. We call the first two categories legal person insiders and the latter two natural person insiders for obvious reasons.
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The total value of insider trading by the legal persons (affiliated companies and strategic investors) is much greater than that by natural persons (managers and other individuals). Before the Guideline, natural persons did not trade through the block trading system at all. That situation changed after the Guideline. While the total transaction value and the number of transactions conducted through the block trading system by natural persons are still small, the transaction size is comparable to that of legal persons.
It should be noted that managers did trade a lot, especially after the Guideline, but their total transaction value remained the smallest.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of block trade discounts by insider type. The block trade discount, Disc, is defined as
where P j is the price of the block trade j, and P c is the closing price of the day in the retail market. From the table, most of block trades have positive discounts, indicating that block trade prices are lower than the closing price of the day, so the block trades are most likely initiated by sellers. After the Guideline, the distributions of the block trade discounts appear to be similar, either between insiders and non-insiders, or across different insider types. The block trade discount has predictive power for the stock performance after the block trade, as will be shown in the next section. 
whereD is the sample average of all the D j s. The greater the value of Eag j , the more eager the insider is to sell the unlocked stocks. The average,D, serves as an arbitrary, but innocuous, benchmark for the eagerness.
The Impact of Insider Trading on Returns of Affected Stocks

The Cumulated Abnormal Returns
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Guideline in stabilizing prices and protecting average investors, we adopt the event-study methodology and examine the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the insider trading date. The CARs are defined in terms of certain systematic factors that are initiated by Fama and French (1993) for the US market and are used by many researchers for international markets. We construct daily observations of MKT, SMB and HML where MKT is the market return in excess of the riskfree rate, SMB is small-stock returns minus big-stock returns, and HML is high book-to-market stock returns minus low book-to-market stock returns. We use the combined Shanghai and Shenzhen composite index return with reinvested dividend as the market return, and the one-year deposit rate as the riskfree rate. The market size is defined by the latest end-of-April market value and the median is used to classify small and big stocks and to construct SMB. The book-to-market ratio is based on the year-end value and the bottom 30% and the top 30% are used to construct HML for stock returns over the next year.
The CARs are defined as follows. For each insider trading transaction j of a stock i on a date labeled as day 0, we estimate a model
where r it is the return on stock i on day t in excess of the riskfree rate. We then fix the estimates of the coefficients and calculate the CAR for insider trading transaction j as
It should be noted that all the CARs we calculate are based on the returns on the retail markets. Insider trading is used as the definition of the event which may occur in the regular retail market or through the block trading system. Similarly, we calculate the CARs using non-insider block trades as the events.
Since the coefficients of the Fama-French model may be time-varying, it is important to guarantee that they do not vary too quickly to render the estimated coefficients obsolete in the application window. To check the validity of the CAR calculation, we also calculate CARs for non-event dates. The non-event CARs estimated in the window (-120, -21) should averaged around zero for the application window (-20, 100). We arbitrarily choose the last trading day of each quarter as the event date and use the same methodology to calculate CARs for all the stocks. Guideline period start at around zero on day -20, quickly climb to about 3%, and slip to about -2% on day 100, generating a roughly 5% loss in the window (0, 100). The rise in
CARs from day -20 to 0 reveals that insiders tend to sell their stocks after the stocks gain in value. The sales, however, tend to send signals to the market and cause the stock price to decline. while the insiders' sales through the block trading system cause the retail market prices to fall dramatically. The average abnormal loss from day 0 to day 100 exceeds 8%. Since sale sizes are different across the two markets, we cannot guess what may happen to the CARs if the shares sold through the block trading system were allowed to be sold in the retail market in the absence of the Guideline. However, judging from the result in Panel B for the pre-Guideline period during which large sale sizes were allowed, it does make one wonder why the market react more negatively to the insiders' sales through the block trading system. One observation, which is worth noting, is that the pre-sale behavior of the CARs during the window (-20,0) is quite different between insiders' retail sales and block sales. There is no obvious run-up in the retail market prices associated with insiders' block sales. We will explain this phenomenon later.
Panel D of Figure 3 compares the average CARs associated with insider block trading and non-insider block trading in the post-Guideline period. The average CAR associated with non-insider block trades does not have the run-up before the trades. It drifts to -3% by day 100. Obviously, this is not entirely due to selling pressure. A conjecture is that, although the sellers are not classified as insiders because their holding does not exceed the threshold of 5%, they may still have connections with the managers of the firms.
Therefore, their sales of the stocks contain certain information that causes the market to react negatively. We do not delve further into this as detailed information about the block holders is not available. In any case, insiders' block trades have much greater impact than non-insiders' block trades.
We interpret the plots in Figure 3 as follows. In general, insiders sell their stock holdings for two main reasons. One is driven by information. The other is for diversification purposes. The former sends bad signals to the market, while the latter may cause temporary selling pressures only. In the pre-Guideline period, insiders predominantly choose to sell in the retail market simply because that way other investors will have difficulty in gauging what the exact motives behind the sales are. The market does not react too negatively and, therefore, insiders can sell large amounts over a reasonably short period without incurring too much loss. The Guideline makes it illegitimate (or potentially costly) for the insiders to sell large amounts within a month. The insiders then face two alternatives: either sell the intended large amounts over longer time periods or sell them immediately through the block trading system at discounts. If the selling motive is purely for diversification, then there should be no rush to sell and no reason to sell them through the block trading system at discounts, so the insiders tend to choose to sell the stocks gradually over longer periods. If the selling motive is to avoid big losses from their private information and there is a possibility that the information may leak within a month, it would then be optimal for the insiders to sell the large amounts immediately through the block trading system even at discounts. Thus, theoretically speaking, the Guideline created an separating equilibrium. The result in Panel C is a reflection that the market correctly recognizes the insiders' motives from the actions they take. In practice, since diversification and informed sales are not mutually exhaustive motives and identifying an insider sale through the block trading system takes time, the market reaction is not as prompt as it should be theoretically.
The previous observation that there is a retail price run-up before the insiders' retail sales, but there is no such a price run-up, is consistent with the interpretation of the separating equilibrium. For diversification purposes, the insiders do not have the urgency and can bide their time until the prices are high. For information driven sales, the insiders do not have the luxury of waiting and have to act as quickly as possible. As a result, there is no particular pattern observed in the retail market prices before the insiders' block sales.
The Determinants of CARs
We now study the determinants of cross-sectional differences among the CARs. We conjecture that both the sale size and the eagerness of the insider to sell have long-lasting effects on the CARs. For the insider trading sample, we run the following regression,
where CAR js is the cumulative abnormal return for sale j over the interval [−20, s] , i is the firm corresponding to the insider trade j, PG j is the post-Guideline dummy variable taking one for sales after the Guideline and zero before the Guideline, BT j is the dummy for block trade, SS j is the sale size as the percentage of outstanding shares, Eag j is the eagerness defined in (2), SZ i is the log total market value of the stock, and BM i is the log book-to-market ratio of the stock. The market value and the book-to-market ratio are included for control purposes only. In some of the regressions, we also add two fixed effects. One is a time fixed effect, QTR, indicating the quarter of the year during which the sale occurs. The other is the industry fixed effect, IND, indicating the industry the involved firm belongs to. 6 The results of the regression are reported in Table 4 . The t-rations in parentheses are clustered by QTR.
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The results in Table 4 show that all the explanatory variables have the anticipated effects on the CARs. The post-Guideline period tends to have lower CARs than the preGuideline period. The sales through the block trading system cause lower CARs than the sales in the retail markets. The greater the relative sale size, the lower the CARs. In addition, the more eager insiders are to sell, the lower the CARs. The block trade dummy and sale size are positively correlated, so one of them becomes less significant when they are used together. The fixed effects boost the goodness-of-fit.
We then turn to the block trade sample. For all the block sales after the Guideline, we run the following regression,
where Ins j is the dummy for insider sale and Disc j is the discount (in percentage) of the block trade price relative to the retail market closing price, defined in (1). Similarly, we include control variables, SZ and BM, and, for some regressions, we add QTR and IND fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 5 . Table 5 here
The results in Table 5 show that for sales through the block trading system, whether the sales are initiated by insiders and how large the discount is are important in determining the CARs. The sale size is not that important.
6 The industry classification is based on that by CSRC. There are a total of 13 broadly classified industries. When QTR fixed effect is added, PG becomes poorly identified, so it is dropped from the regression. The same principle applies to other regressions that follow.
7 The OLS t-ratios without clustering are much higher than with clustering. The t-ratio clustered by IND is slightly higher than those clustered by QTR in general. Two-way clustering generates a non-positive estimated variance of the estimator, as discussed by Cameron et al (2011) in Section 2.3.
Block Trade Discounts
In this subsection, we investigate the determinants of the block trading discounts. For the sample of all block trades, we run the following regression,
with and without the QTR and IND fixed effects. For the sample of insider block trades, we run the following regression,
with and without the QTR and IND fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 6 . Table 6 here
The results in Panel A of Table 6 show that all the explanatory variables in (7) contribute strongly to the discounts with the anticipated signs. Insider sales tend to increase the discounts, in line with the observations from Panel D of Figure 4 and Table   3 . The relative sale size contributes to a larger discount. Small firms and growth firms tend to have larger discounts. Within the insider sale sample, the eagerness also contributes positively to the discounts.
Insider Trading and Future Earnings
A common theme in the literature of insider trading is that insiders possess information about the value of the firms, and so do their trades if sales are not for diversification purposes. To examine whether insider trades contain any information about future performance of the firms, we run the following regressions, at the firm/quarter level, for the post-Guideline period,
where ROE iq is the return-on-equity of firm i in quarter q. Other variables with a bar on top have a similar meaning, but are either aggregated (for SS) or averaged (for BT and Eag) within firm i and quarter q. The regressions are run for k = 1, 2, 3 and 4, with and without fixed effects QTR and IND. The results are stronger for k = 3 and 4 than k = 1 and 2, which are in line with the results in the literature for other countries. Table   8 reports the one-quarter-ahead (k = 1) and the four-quarter-ahead (k = 4) earnings forecasts. Table 7 here
The results in Table 7 show that future ROEs can be predicted by current ROEs, as has been found in many other contexts. The intensity of block trades by insiders contains bad news; the aggregate sale size and average eagerness also contain bad news about future earnings. Roughly speaking, the magnitudes of the coefficients are greater for the four-quarter-ahead forecasts than for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts. Overall, insider sales of the unlocked stocks contain bad news about future earnings of the firms.
Flipping
As we explained earlier, insider sales conducted through the block trading system may reveal bad news about the company, so the counterparties (i.e., the buyers) from the block trading system tend to protect themselves by requiring a larger discount. To complete the story, we need to show that the same counterparties also have incentives to dispose of the shares they buy quickly before more investors recognize the motives of the insiders and before the prices fall enough to wipe out their gains from the discounts.
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The complete data on what the counterparties in the block trading system do with their acquired stocks are not available. We infer their behavior from two sources. One source is the block trading system. Since the counterparties of the insider block trades are not restricted from reselling the stocks through the block trading system, if they do resell there, records are available. Let CB j0 be the block purchase in terms of shares by the counterparty and CS jt be the block sale in terms of shares by the counterparty on day t after the block sale. The cumulative percentage shares sold by the counterparty on day s is
Panel A of Figure 4 plots the average CPS js against s for the next 100 trading days. It shows that, by day 100, an average of 20% of shares are sold by the counterparties of the insiders to other parties. The average return earned by the counterparties in reselling the stocks through the block trade system is positive, but insignificant, as discounts prevail when they resell the stocks even though the counterparties are not insiders. we follow it for the next 30 trading days t. We name UPF jt = 1 if day t is a day with unusual price fluctuations and the daily return is negative and UPF jt = 0 otherwise. We also name BR jt = 1 if one of the five broker branches is used by the counterparty and BR jt = 0 otherwise. We then sum UPF and BR across all js and plot them in Panel B of 9 A stock is regarded as having an unusual price fluctuation on a day if (a) the difference in absolute value between the daily return on the stock and daily return on the market index is greater than 7%, (b) the difference between the daily maximum price and daily minimum price is more than 15% of the closing price of the last trading day, (c) daily turnover exceeds 20%, (d) the cumulative difference in absolute value in the last three trading days between the daily return on the stock and daily return on the market index is greater than 20%, or (e) the sum of turnovers in the last three trading days exceeds 20% and the ratio of average turnover in the last three trading days to that in the previous five trading days exceeds 30.
The counterparties of the insider block trades can dispose of the stocks they acquire in the retail market. There are numerous trading strategies to realize such flipping trades.
To get a sense of how profitable these strategies can be, we calculate hypothetical returns, assuming the counterparty sells the entire block of the stock t days after the block trade in the retail market at the closing price on day t (without further disturbing the closing price). Panel C of Figure 4 plots the average abnormal returns against t.
10 The results
show that the hypothetical abnormal returns are positive on average if the counterparties sell the stock within 50 days. Of course, it is unlikely that the counterparties would sell the entire block of the stock on one day without disturbing the market. It is more conceivable that the counterparties would sell the acquired stock from the block trading system piecemeal in the retail market. Panel (D) plot the average abnormal returns to the hypothetical strategies that sell the stock in equal installments within the first k days after the block trade, where k = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 60. As expected, the faster the counterparties resell the stocks, the higher the returns are on average. As such, the scenario described earlier that insiders sell the stocks through the block trading system at discounts to avoid future losses, while the counterparties resell the stocks they buy at discounts in the retail market with profits, is very plausible.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Earning Forecasts by Insider Type
In The sharp contrasts before and after the Guideline are interesting to explore. The difference in average CARs between the pre-and post-Guideline periods for the managers is small. Recall that both the total value or the number of sales by managers are small. The more interesting part is the role played by the affiliated companies, which are responsible for the negative average CARs in the post-Guideline period. A clue can be found in Table 2 where it is shown that more than half of the managers' sales in terms of total value and the number of transactions are sold through the block trading system in the post-Guideline period, whereas almost none is so in the pre-Guideline period. As we explained before, sales through the block trading system with discounts are viewed by outside investors as informative about firm performance in the future and hence the negative CARs. Further supportive evidence will be given in the next subsection.
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Various Types of Insiders
In regression analysis of the cross-sectional differences, we define four dummy variables for the different types of insiders: affiliated companies (Affi), strategic investors (Stra), managers (Mana), and other individual insiders (Indi). Regressions similar to (5) are run with added dummies variables for the four types of insiders specified above for the post-Guideline period. All the control variables are demeaned. The results are reported in Table 8 . Table 8 here
The results in Table 8 confirm the plots in Figure 5 . Affiliated companies contributed negatively, while other types of insiders contributed positively, to the CARs.
Insider Trading and Future Earnings
To explore the role played by the different types of insiders, we investigate again the information about future earnings. We run the regressions similar to (9) with added dummy variables representing insider types. The regression results are reported in Table 9 for one-quarter-ahead and four-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts. All the variables, except for the insider type dummies, are demeaned. Their coefficient estimates are similar to those in Table 7 and thus are omitted here. Table 9 here
The results in Table 9 confirm that all the variables have coefficients with signs consistent with the predictions of the hypotheses put forward in this paper. In particular, the sales by affiliated companies strongly predict lower future earnings. This finding completes the story for why sales by affiliated companies became the main driver of the negative CARs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of a specific regulation, in the Guideline, issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission that requires corporate insiders to sell their unlocked restrictive shares through the block trading system if the amount they expect to sell within a month exceeds one percent of the outstanding shares. The alleged purpose of the regulation is to reduce the negative impact on the prices of affected stocks and to protect outside investors. We find that the regulation is ineffective. There is an average of a 5% risk-adjusted loss over a 100-day holding period in the post-Guideline period if investors buy the stocks at the time insiders sell. This is worse than in the pre-Guideline period. The loss is even higher, roughly 8%, if the insiders sell through the block trading system.
We hypothesize that the main reason the regulation does not work is that the regulatory authority fails to recognize that the regulation creates a separating equilibrium in which insiders with diversification purposes tend to sell gradually in the retail market whereas insiders with negative views about the company tend to sell large quantities immediately through the block trading system. The market recognizes this mechanism and reacts to the sales through the block trading system more negatively. The regulation does not work also because it does not impose a corresponding restriction of resale on the counterparties of the insiders in the block trading system. As a result, the regulation simply redistributes part of the gains from insiders to the counterparties. This is somewhat like the case in the US where regulations merely redistribute the gains from insiders to a handful of information specialists.
The evidence we document in the paper is consistent with our hypotheses. The loss is bigger in the post-Guideline period than in the pre-Guideline period on average, when the discount in the block sale is greater, when the insider sale size as a percentage of all shares is bigger, and when the insider is more eager to sell. The discount also positively depends on the sale size and the eagerness. We find insider sales predict lower future earnings. We also find some evidence of flipping by the counterparties in the block trading system.
While we have focused on a specific regulation on insider trading in China, the findings in this paper have broader implications about insider trading regulation in general.
For China's regulatory authorities, an immediate lesson is the consistency and the gametheoretical aspects which they need to pay more attention to in designing future regula- 
